| |
|
Discussion
Several points were raised in discussion
that helped to put these IPR theories and mechanisms into an African
context.
- With regard to breeders’ rights, the
question was raised whether the rules do not favor big companies over
small farmers and scientists at universities and research institutes;
although the process is less expensive than for patents, the fees
may still be out of reach of many small innovators, who also may not
have the resources for DUS testing. Roth responded that, in the European
system, the farmer is not responsible for doing the DUS test; she
just submits the sample to the responsible government office. Roth
also added that asexually reproduced plants, e.g., flowers and potatoes,
are relatively easy and inexpensive to breed, and as such are not
beyond the reach of the small farmer (unlike maize, which can be quite
complicated to breed).
- The controversial issue of applying
for patents on genes was raised and discussed at some length. Here
the line between invention and discovery can be very fine. A gene
exists already; if it is identified and isolated, i.e., discovered,
but is otherwise unaltered, can it be patented? Some feel that if
in the process of identifying and isolating the gene a significant
problem was solved in an ingenious way, and/or that the gene is removed
from its natural context and applied to new uses, then it is patentable.
But what exactly should be patentable: the process of isolating the
gene; the gene itself; a modified gene; usage of the gene in products
or processes; gene fragments or "tags"? Furthermore, who
is the inventor? Gene identification can be "just a list of sequences
coming out of one machine and into a word processor or a database
with no human intervention." No patent or court system has given
us the final word on this issue as yet.
- With regard to public versus private
responsibility for access to seeds, several points were made. In much
of West Africa, research institutes are funded by governments and
donors. When new varieties are invented, the results are in many cases
considered to be in the public domain; the seeds may be sold on a
competitive basis, but there is no IPR component, no restriction on
saving seeds, and so forth. It was noted that in the case of Nigeria
there is a national seed service that distributes seeds to farmers
after a process of testing and selection. Unfortunately, the research
part of the system is often subverted by "leakages" at the
testing stages; sometimes when the researcher goes to the test farm
to obtain crop yield results, she finds the produce at the local market,
making accurate data collection impossible. Illicit transport of seed
(i.e., smuggling) is also common in the region, making enforcement
of any rules or rights extremely difficult.
- More generally, the issue was raised
of whether the public good is better served by a regime driven by
IPR and commercial interests or one driven by keeping research results
in the public domain and making improved germplasm available as widely
as possible. The classical "free market" response is that
the private sector is better equipped to innovate, disseminate, and
provide service given the incentives that property rights provide.
IPR’s prevention of copying is supposed to stimulate ever greater
innovation. Critics argue that profit motives and property rights
agreements like TRIPS hurt the poor, draw resources from the South
to the North, and have no place in the critical realm of food supply.
An analogy can be made to the "open source" software paradigm,
also known as "copyleft," in which software code is made
freely available for anyone to study and submit improvements, with
nobody making a claim to IPR. The system has produced top quality
software that is constantly improving, including popular Unix operating
systems such as Linux and FreeBSD. This paradigm actively shuns property
rights and has completely different incentives, which clearly work
to improve and disseminate the product. Should seeds be like software?
Unfortunately, the workshop, like the rest of the world, has failed
to resolve this ideological issue definitively. It can be mentioned
in this context, however, that breeders’ rights can be considered
a kind of middle ground, as they provide a reasonable level of protection
and make fairly generous exemptions for research use and farmer-saved
seeds.
- The question was also raised as to who
has the right to apply for intellectual property protection in a case
where there are several potential applicants, e.g., an individual
researcher, his institution, and the government or other funding organization.
Roth replied that in most cases initially the right belongs to the
individual breeder, but that in many cases that right is shared with
the employer. In the United States, the decision to allow universities
and individual scientists to retain a share of IPR on government-funded
research has led to the university playing a greater role in the innovations
marketplace. (In addition, universities are also uniquely well able
to bring private sector competitors together into research consortia,
with appropriate agreements as to responsibilities and benefit-sharing,
and are able to "make things happen that wouldn’t otherwise happen.")
- Along the same lines, one workshop participant
noted that putting a strong IPR regime into place in West Africa will
not by itself guarantee that innovation and commercialization will
ensue, or that Africans will benefit by it. He stressed the importance
of the overall enabling environment, including allowing individual
scientists to gain from commercial exploitation of their research.
Roth noted that this blurring of lines between sectors—academic, government,
industry—is a growing feature of the information age. Many individuals
are increasingly wearing multiple hats, e.g., a professor sitting
on the board of a private company and serving on a government committee.
Policymakers will need to take this reality into account, in biodiversity
conservation and use schemes and many other endeavors.
|
|
MODULE III
Introduction
Forms of Protection for Biological
Inventions
Discussion
Contractual Models for Managing IPR
Important IPR Institutions
Important IPR Treaties
Group Breakouts
University Technology Transfer Offices
|