CSTSP has crafted policy responses to government released initiatives, in order to help contextualize and evaluate the state of government policies within science, technology, and security.
United States Government Policy for Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern (2013)
14 April 2013
AAAS respectfully submitted the following comments to Dr. Franca R. Jones, assistant director of the Chemical and Biological Countermeasures, Office of Science and Technology Policy, with the interest of strengthening our nation’s ability to prevent misuse of the life sciences.
Select Agents and Toxins, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (2011)
3 January 2011
We believe the FESAP’s deliberative and inclusive approach resulted in a balanced and thoughtful set of recommendations for minimizing safety and security risks associated with select agent research while reducing administrative and financial burdens on the research community.
Letter on the Export Control Reform Initiative (2010)
February 7, 2010
The American Association for the Advancement of Science joined with the Association of American Universities, the Council on Governmental Relations, and the Association of Public and Land-grant Universities to commend the Administration on its ongoing Export Control Reform Initiative. The societies were responding to requests for comment from the Department of State, which implements export controls on weapons and military technologies, and the Department of Commerce, which implements controls on “dual-use” technologies that are commercial in nature but could be used for military purposes. A letter signed by the respective society presidents was filed with the Commerce and State Departments on February 7, 2010.
Minimizing the Risks of Synthetic DNA: Scientists’ Views on the U.S. Government’s Guidance on Synthetic Genomics (2010)
11 January 2010
On January 11, 2010, the AAAS CSTSP hosted a meeting to discuss the draft U.S. Sequence Framework for Synthesis of Double Stranded DNA providers with the scientific community and gene synthesis providers. Stakeholders from academia, private industry, and the gene synthesis industry all support the voluntary guidance. Although meeting participants identified specific concerns and offered specific recommendations to address some of those concerns, the overall sentiment was that the guidance is well thought out, facilitates advances in scientific knowledge, and allows for international engagement.
WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act Response Letter (2009)
2 November 2009
AAAS wants to thank the Senate Armed Services Committee for the opportunity to provide our comments on teh WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act (S. 1649).
Working Group on Strengthening the Biosecurity of the United States (2009)
12 May 2009
Letter in relation to the Interagency Working Group Recommendations on Strengthening Laboratory Biosecurity (Executive Order 13486)
BARDA Strategic Plan Response Letter (2007)
26 October 2007
The development of a strategic plan to address future and potential chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats is a critical step in protecting our nation. We are pleased that the HHS Office of Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) incorporated AAAS’s comments (submitted on October 10, 2006) on the Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasure Enterprise (PHEMCE) Strategy and also considered our recommendations for scientific experts to participate on the National Biodefense Science Board (submitted July 2007). We respectfully offer the following comments on the draft BARDA strategic plan.