Conversations: 1950

October 25, 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Conversation with. Dr. Lee A. DuBridge, President of California Tech, Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., President of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Irvin Stewart, President, of the University of West Virginia -- at lunch with Charles Stauffacher

We touched on a number of high spots and tossed up a few trial balloons. We can meet again in twosomes or otherwise, when desirable.

DuBridge impressed me as extraordinarily keen and quick; Killian, more as an administrator; and Stewart as being very serious, thorough, and dependable. Killian especially, and DuBridge also, agreed with the Bush idea that there would be no value in setting up now, or really even in planning an OSRD type mobilization for science organization. Their attitude is that when the crisis comes, the organization will spring up virtually automatically around the science leaders who will come to the fore spontaneously.

As to how many top echelon or key scientists there are, around whom any mobilization would devolve, DuBridge said that there is a continuous spectrum and it would be difficult to decide where to raw the line. However, ever, it appears that the number is probably somewhere between 20 and 200. I suggested that it might be useful for Dr. DuBridge and some others in his category to play a sort of war game with the placement of this key top scientific personnel. That is, assuming that war were to appear imminent or be upon us, in what activities and fields of research would these key men ideally be placed. There was some discussion, Dr. DuBridge pointing out that placement would depend upon the relative order of urgency and significance of various programs and areas that these would vary from time to time, and that furthermore, he was not well enough informed of the R&DB programs at this time.

Manpower studies are very important - Killian was particularly strong on this. These studies should comprehend not only the key personnel but also lower echelons of scientists and. engineers. We mentioned that, per Mr. Kidd’s conversation with Stauffacher and me yesterday, the NSRB is considering setting up a scientific manpower advisory committee and we asked their views. Killian and DuBridge both thought it a good idea. Some discussion as to best organization to which it should report, and conclusion that NSRB was best.

Would a Scientific Adviser or a Scientific Advisory Committee to the President be a good idea at this time? This would be a part-time body comparable to the General Advisory Committee of the AEC but with the broad function of keeping posted on all military-scientific research. Its responsibilities, like those of like GAC would be solely to make recommendations in its judgment and like the GAC, it should have access to all the information it wished and be privileged to call upon the R&DB, the AEC, the NACA (and perhaps the NSF), etc. for presentations on any subjects in which it was interested. This idea met with considerable favor. DuBridge even mused on whether its offices should be in the Pentagon as a matter of convenience, or elsewhere for greater objectivity. He went far enough out into it to wonder what Government agency would attend to paying of travel vouchers and such like. He thought in terms of a committee somewhat larger than the nine man GAC, in view of its broad field. All agreed that such a body should liquidate almost automatically if war came or became imminent, and that out of it would spring, in some indeterminate manner, the new OSRD in whatever form was best suited to the conditions then prevailing.

DuBridge especially felt, or rather took as a matter of course, that there would be a considerable area for activity by an OSRD type organization despite the great progress made by military research organizations. This was not discussed into any definite conclusions. He stressed, however, and Killian agreed, that if war was at hand there would be a considerable number of top scientists not yet engaged in full-time military work who would be too valuable to put in subordinate positions and for whom there would not be, even as civilians, a sufficient number of major posts. Thus, again the need for an ORSD.

As to the question of whether there were already too many advisory committees, DuBridge responded that, if anything, there were not enough. As to the question of whether there should be an effort made to coordinate the membership on the many committees, both he and Killian felt that very definitely this should continue on a haphazard, self-adjusting basis. As to the question of whether it would be desirable to have any kind of overall coordination or at least some degree of awareness in one place, of the responsibility of the research programs of the Department of Defense (which converge in the R&DB), NACA, AEC, NSF, etc., there was a little discussion but no indication of conclusions. The question is increasingly significant because of the much larger sums of money being spent for research and the increasingly larger manpower involved. Hence, informal awareness and avoidance of competition and gaps become increasingly difficult or inadequate. This question should be returned to.

An ad hoc review board for the R&DB was set up within recent months by Bill Webster. It consists of DuBridge (with Bacher as alternate), Killian, Hovde, Kelley of Bell Tel Labs, R. E;. Wilson of Standard Oil of Indiana and perhaps one or two others. This must be Committee that Carroll Wilson mentioned to me as including R. E. Wilson. They met a month or so ago and were given what Killian described as an excellent presentation of the R&DB’s activities. They are going to meet again about November 5th to draw together their advisory report.

There was recurrent discussion of the Stewart Report on "Mobilizing Science" and he (Stewart) made it clear that if it were thought that it would do any good he would try to have his name withdrawn as a candidate for the position- of Scientific Adviser called for in that report. He made it clear that he had no ambition for the job and that he agreed to the suggestion which was made by someone else solely because it would be evident that since he is not a scientist he would be there solely on interim position to be replaced as soon as conditions became more critical. He was told there would be no point in taking this step. He said that the report finally recommended that the Scientific Adviser report to the Secretary of Defense with the right of appeal to the President rather than report to the President directly solely because Secretary Johnson told the Committee that the President did not wish the adviser to report to him directly. Stauffacher had never heard of any such thing and was confident that it must have been misunderstood.

Stewart may be in Washington early next week to see Secretary Lovett, with Bill Webster, about the Stewart Report, "Mobilizing Science."

William T. Golden