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After years of streamlining and downsizing as part of the
management principle "faster, better, cheaper,"
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
has declared that its cuts have gone too far. Two reports
examining NASA's Mars program have blamed recent failures
of the Mars orbiter and lander on management problems and
a lack of funding which are by-products of the faster, better,
cheaper philosophy.
"Faster, better, cheaper encourages taking prudent
risk where justified by the return," one of the reports
says. Risk associated with innovation and science is appropriate,
but risk associated with deviation from sound management
principles is not.
As a result, NASA announced that it has cancelled a new
Mars lander scheduled for 2001, but will go forward with
plans for a new orbiter. The agency also announced that
Firouz Naderi, the manager of the Origins Program, which
searches for life beyond the solar system, would head up
a new Mars Program Office at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory
(JPL).
The report issued last month by the Mars Program Independent
Assessment Team headed, by Thomas Young a retired Lockheed
Martin executive, examined all of the Mars missions undertaken
since the advent of faster, better, cheaper. It identifies
a probable cause of the most recent Mars Polar Lander failure
and makes recommendations for the program's future. Although
it holds that "faster, better, cheaper, properly applied,
is an effective concept," it finds that misunderstandings
of this management philosophy resulted in "significant
flaws" in the program. The report emphasizes the need
for sound project management and adequate financial margins
in deep space missions.
The principle of faster, better, cheaper was first incorporated
into the Mars program in 1996, when NASA launched two tremendously
successful missions: the Mars Global Surveyor, which is
still orbiting the red planet and sending back valuable
scientific data; and the Pathfinder mission, which featured
a small rover and performed important scientific tests while
returning dramatic photographs. However, in late 1999, the
program experienced two major mission failures, with losses
of the Mars Climate Orbiter and Mars Polar Lander.
The orbiter, which was designed to settle into orbit around
Mars and provide climate data, was lost in September when
it went hurtling into the planet's atmosphere. The cause
was identified shortly thereafter as an embarrassing failure
to convert operating data from English to metric units.
The Young report determined that oversight and testing required
to reveal potential flaws "were deficient."
The lander, which was designed to examine the planet's
surface, was lost in December when the craft failed to reestablish
radio contact with mission controllers as expected. The
report finds that the "most probable cause" of
failure was premature shutdown of the landing engines causing
the lander to crash into the surface of Mars at roughly
50 mph rather than the planned landing speed of 5 mph. However,
the craft was not equipped to maintain radio contact throughout
its descent, so there is no way to determine just how close
to the surface it got before something went wrong, and therefore
no way of verifying the cause of the failure. The decision
to forego capability for radio contact was a gamble that
saved money but sacrificed NASA's ability to learn from
its errors. The Young report called the decision "a
major mistake."
As with the orbiter, testing of the lander was incomplete.
Trouble with the landing system was obscured in initial
tests by a wiring flaw. After this flaw was fixed, the tests
were not repeated. If they had been, the fatal problem would
probably have been detected and could have been fixed by
a simple change in the system's computer code.
The second report, which was chaired by John Casani of
JPL, focused only on the Mars Polar Lander failure. Both
the JPL and the Young reports criticized the project's funding,
management, and staffing levels. The cost of the lander,
which was much lower than earlier planetary missions, was
about 30 percent too low, the reports found. The lander
was kept on a very tight schedule to accommodate a narrow
launch window, exacerbating the funding problems. Since
the onset of faster, better, cheaper, JPL has been working
on three times as many projects simultaneously as it used
to, and the lab's experienced project managers have been
stretched to the limit. As a result, the lander and orbiter
projects utilized inexperienced managers. The lack of funding
led to staffing shortages, the Casani report found, rendering
the workforce insufficient for "the levels of checks
and balances normally found in JPL projects."
While the Young report criticizes NASA's management failures,
it recommends that the Mars program continue to operate
under the principle of faster, better, cheaper. It suggests
that the program be given greater funding, that training
and mentoring programs be set up for staff, and that management
principles be augmented with clear definitions, policies,
and procedures to guide a project's implementation.
In response to these investigative reports, the Senate
Commerce Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space announced
that it would step up oversight of NASA. The subcommittee
has obtained documents from NASA on the testing of the lander,
which it has shared with the House Science Committee. An
independent review of these documents is planned. "A
thorough review … is not just in order, but is imperative,"
said Senate Commerce Committee chairman John McCain (R-AZ).
Subcommittee chairman Bill Frist (R-TN) echoed this concern.
"It may be time to amend NASA's mantra of `faster,
better, cheaper' to include `back to the basics,'"
he said.
At a hearing before the subcommittee on March 22, NASA
Administrator Dan Goldin vigorously defended faster, better,
cheaper. Of 146 missions carried out under this principle,
Goldin testified, 136 have been successful. He vowed that
NASA will not abandon its risk-taking philosophy and compared
the agency's current strategy to the more conservative one
that preceded it. "I have absolutely no regrets, no
concerns, no apologies," he said. "… When
you're afraid, you set mediocre goals, everyone's happy,
and budgets go up."
Goldin did make clear, however, that he is addressing the
agency's recent problems. "NASA is deliberately encouraging
a culture change in which any person can speak up,"
he said. The agency will put a halt to its cost-cutting
measures, institute new training and mentoring programs,
and form better oversight and review procedures. Accordingly,
NASA has requested its first budget increase in seven years
and plans to hire 2000 new employees. "We wanted to
see where the boundaries [of faster, better, cheaper] were,"
Goldin said. "… We have now hit the limit."
House Science Committee chairman F. James Sensenbrenner,
Jr. (R-WI), who has often been at odds with Goldin, held
a hearing addressing the Mars failures featuring testimony
from Young and Casani. Sensenbrenner opened the April 12
hearing by stating his belief that effective management
is NASA's biggest challenge. "Our role is not to try
to micromanage each mission, project, or program,"
he said. "But, after reading these reports, I am left
to wonder: who was managing them?" The committee
plans to hold another hearing on the topic the second week
in May with Goldin testifying.
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