Scientific Publication Policies

The federal government has historically allowed open publication of federally funded research. National Security Decision Directive 189 (NSDD-189) states that basic research results could only be controlled by classification. This policy is still in effect. However, after September 11, 2001 the U.S. was left with a heightened sense of vulnerability. The scientific community, traditionally thriving on the open and free flow of information, must now seriously consider whether and to what extent to restrict the publication of certain studies for the sake of national security. In discussions among journal editors, researchers, government officials, and others, most participants share the view that some information maybe too sensitive for publication. How to identify and restrict that information remains a source of dispute. [1] Research communities still strongly hold to their view that scientific information should remain open and accessible.

The federal government uses three methods to restrict publication and dissemination of research: classification, export controls, and pre-publication review. Classification is the traditional means of controlling scientific information. Most academic institutions do not carry out classified research, because they see it as being in conflict with their mission. Others permit it to be done off campus. [2]

Export controls limit the transfer of information and technology. The Department of Commerce implements Export Administration Regulations (EAR), which prohibit export of dual-use technologies on the Commerce Control List without license. The Department of State implements the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which controls export of items such as armaments and military technologies on the Munitions Control List. Both have exemptions for fundamental research. Export controls on information use the concept of a "deemed export," which is the transfer of information, not physical goods, to a foreign national without first obtaining an export license for that technology. George W. Bush invoked the International Economic Emergency Powers Act (P.L. 95-223) to maintain export control since the Export Administration Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-72) was not reauthorized by the 107th Congress. Export controls of information are particularly worrisome to universities, since it limits free and open access to information in the classroom. [3] A report by the Department of Commerce's Inspector General recommended stricter enforcement of current export controls to stem flow of sensitive technology to foreign nationals. The report also found that if the DOC requires deemed export licenses for the use of controlled equipment by foreign nationals for fundamental research, the impact and burden on universities would be significant and "strike at the core goal of universities in promoting scholarship regardless of national origin." [4]

Pre-publication review is sometimes used as a condition for accepting research grants or contracts. These restrictions are usually narrowly-targeted, and do not apply to whole fields of research. Universities generally do not approve of prepublication review, and many have refused research grants and contracts where this was a condition for accepting the government's funding. [5]

In February 2001, researchers published an article describing their attempt to create a mouse contraceptive by inserting a gene into the mousepox virus that resulted in a deadly virus that killed mice vaccinated against mousepox. The paper was condemned for illustrating how to make a virus more deadly. [6] In October 2001, the full genome of Yersinia pestis, the bacteria that causes bubonic and pneumonic plague was published in the journal Nature. [7]A study published in May 2002 "provided details about how smallpox uses a protein to evade the human immune system." Some feared that enemies could use this information to produce bioweapons. [8]

In July 2002, a study describing how to make a poliovirus from mail-order DNA was published. Florida Rep. Dave Weldon described this as "'a blueprint that could conceivably enable terrorists to inexpensively create human pathogens for release...'" [9] The full genome sequence of Coxiellia burnetii, the agent causing Q fever was published in Proceedings of the National Academies of Science (PNAS) in April 2003. During the same month, the annotated genome of Bacillus anthracis, the agent causing anthrax, was published in Nature. [10] A George Mason University graduate student's dissertation came under scrutiny in July 2003 and might become classified. The student "mapped every business and industrial sector in the American economy, layering on top the fiber-optic network that connects them," thus laying bare the "country's nervous system." [11]

In September 2003, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) under the Treasury Department ruled that publishers may publish but not edit scientific works by authors living in countries under trade embargo, such as Iran, Libya, Sudan, and Cuba. This interpretation was based on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. [12] In April of 2004, OFAC reversed its earlier ruling and allowed the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) to resume publishing, editing, and peer reviewing scholarly manuscripts submitted by authors living in countries under trade embargo. OFAC acknowledged that IEEE's publishing process falls under the Berman Amendment to trade law, which exempts the exchange of information from sanctions. Despite this reversal, members of scientific and engineering societies in embargoed countries are still prohibited from taking advantage of services offered to full members. This ruling does not necessarily extend to other publishers. [13]

A major challenge in this dispute is the dual-use nature of microbiology and biotechnology when research results used for legitimate reasons can also be used as weapons. [14] Some argue that scientific knowledge is not necessarily beneficial. Bioethicist Arthur Caplan worries that, "'We have to get away from the ethos that knowledge is good. ... Information will kill us in the techno-terrorist age.'" Furthermore, scientists cannot possibly develop defenses against all conceivable biological warfare threats, [15] and publication of what scientists do know could expose the nation's strengths and weaknesses. This is the controversy surrounding the George Mason University graduate student's dissertation, which has been called "'a cookbook of how to exploit the vulnerabilities of our nation's infrastructure.'"[16] Those who oppose restrictions contend that they would deter researchers from pursuing studies that could be beneficial, and that they would only delay the spread of information, since it could be rediscovered.[17] After the American Society for Microbiology (ASM) changed the review policies for its eleven journals, requiring editors to be alert for sensitive information, they found that some authors began imposing self-censorship. ASM's president, Ronald Atlas, argues against such actions, as well as proposals to limit or remove the methods section of research papers. "Science, by its definition, is supposed to be repeatable, and if we permit publication of manuscripts that lack sufficient detail...we will be undercutting science."[18] Additionally, some scientists believe that instead of endangering national security, openness will benefit security if "researchers have access to information that may lead to new vaccines, detectors, and treatments."[19] This latter view emphasizes the importance of scientific review, scrutiny, and replication among colleagues in order to reduce the likelihood of mistakes and to promote advancement.

It is widely accepted that any review process must be clear, unambiguous, and internationally accepted for it to be effective. White House Office of Science and Technology Policy Director John H. Marburger states that such a process will garner international support. [20] A National Academy of Sciences' committee to reviewed current publication mechanisms for biotechnology, and issued a report urging the government to continue to support NSDD-189, as well as develop new mechanisms to assess and respond to potentially hazardous research. [21]

Some agencies have already taken steps to restrict the flow of dangerous information. In 2002, several universities reported increasing restrictions and requirements on government contracts, primarily relating to publications and the participation of foreign nationals in government funded defense related research. This generated protest by universities, which argue the restrictions compromise the openness of university research. [22] As a result, DoD subsequently dropped a number of the restrictions. In February 2003, the editors of more than twenty leading scientific journals announced that they will review, and either edit or reject articles that could pose danger to national security. This voluntary act of self-censorship is seen by some as the scientific community's response to "a thinly veiled threat of government censorship by the Bush administration."[23] Marburger asserts the need to plan future processes carefully, since ill-planned security measures "can backfire if they do not significantly improve security" relative to the cost they impose on science and federal agencies. [24]

Ryan Ricks
July 2004

Notes
[1]. 1 Joint Editors and Author Group. "Statement on Scientific Publication and Security." Science. 299(2003): 1149.
[2]. Shea, Dana A. "Balancing Scientific Publication and National Security Concerns: Issues for Congress." CRS Report for Congress. February 2, 2004. (RL31695).
[3]. Ibid
[4]. "Deemed Export Controls May Not Stop the Transfer of Sensitive Technology to Foreign Nationals in the U.S." Department of Commerce's Inspector General report (IPE-16176, March 2004)
[5]. Ibid.
[6]. Monastersky, Richard. "Publish and Perish?" The Chronicle of Higher Education. October 11, 2002: A16.
[7]. Shea, Ibid.
[8]. Monastersky, Ibid.
[9]. Ibid.
[10]. Shea, Ibid.
[11]. Blumenfeld, Laura. "Dissertation Could be Security Threat." Washington Post. July 8, 2003: A01.
[12]. Kumagai, Jean. "Will U.S. Sanctions Have Chilling Effect on Scholarly Publishing?" IEEE Spectrum Online. 15 October 2003.
[13]. Kugamai, Jean and William Sweet. "U.S. Treasury Department Issues Free Press Ruling." Spectrum Online. 12 April 2004.
[14]. Zilinskas, Raymond A., and Jonathan B. Tucker. "Limiting the Contribution of the Open Scientific Literature to the Biological Weapons Threat." Journal of Homeland Security. December 2002.
[15]. Ibid
[16]. Blumenfeld, Ibid.
[17]. Zilinskas, Ibid.
[18]. Schmid, Randolph E. "Some Scientists Worry Published Research May Be Used By Terrorists." Associated Press. July 27, 2002
[19]. Shea, Dana A. "Balancing Scientific Publication and National Concerns: Issues for Congress." CRS Report for Congress, RL31695. January 10, 2003
[20]. Schultz, William G. "Science at a Time of Terror." Chemical and Engineering News. January 27, 2003.
[21]. "Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism." National Research Council, 2004.
[22]. Gast, Alice P. and Julie T. Norris. "Troublesome Clauses in Research Awards." MIT Memorandum. January 29, 2003.
[23]. Seattle Post-Intelligencer Editorial Board. "Not So Fast on Self-Censorship." Seattle Post-Intelligencer. February 28, 2003.
[24]. Marburger, John. "The War on Terrorism: What Does it Mean for Science?" AAAS Symposium. December 18, 2001.
Resources Inspector General of the Department of Defense report on export of sensitive technologies
CRS report "Balancing Scientific Publication and National Security Concerns: Issues for Congress" (02/02/04, PDF format)