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Science and Security in the Post-9/11 Environment

"Sensitive But Unclassified" Information

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There has always been a delicate balance between freedom of scientific research and national security, particularly during the Cold War. The balance is kept in check through debate between those who believe free and open research is beneficial for the country and national security, and those who wish to guard against the use of the results of research in harmful ways by enemies of the U.S.

In November 2001, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice cited the importance of "open and collaborative basic" scientific research in combating terrorism and reaffirmed that "the policy set forth in NSDD-189 shall remain in effect" in the U.S. government.[1] National Security Decision Directive 189 (NSDD-189), signed by former President Ronald Reagan, guaranteed that there would be "no restrictions…upon the conduct or reporting of federally-funded fundamental research that has not received national security classification."[2] Shortly after Rice's letter, Andrew H. Card, Jr., President Bush's Chief of Staff, issued a memorandum to government agencies in March 2002 on safeguarding "sensitive but unclassified" (SBU) information, also known as "Sensitive Homeland Security Information."[3] The SBU term later appeared in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law No. 107-296) in Sections 891 and 892, which detailed procedures and guidelines for the sharing of SBU information. Consisting of declassified but "sensitive" information, the SBU label serves as a means of "preserv[ing] confidentiality without formal classification."[4] The establishment of such a category as "sensitive but unclassified" information has significant implications for scientific research and communication because of potential restrictions on information exchange between scientists, the government, and the public.

In January 2002, as part of the effort to safeguard SBU information, the Bush administration began withdrawing more than 6,500 declassified documents relating to sensitive chemical and biological warfare information from public access. The White House also proposed that journal editors not publish "sections of articles that give experimental details researchers from other labs would need to replicate the claimed results" to create biological weapons. [5] In September 2002, the National Research Council published a study for the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) [6] on agricultural bioterrorism with eight case-studies excised due to USDA concerns that the case studies could compromise national security. In March 2002, the Department of Defense circulated Security Directive 106 (SD106) on "Research and Technology Protection (RTP) within the Department of Defense" detailing methods to safeguard Critical Research Technology (CRT) and Critical Program Information (CRI) at Department of Defense Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) sites.[7] The directive was later retracted in May 2002 after opposition by scientists at universities and other research institutions to measures potentially restricting foreign travel, foreign collaboration, and publication of findings.

In accordance with the SBU categorization of information, federal agencies have been removing previously public documents from the Internet, ordering that information at public libraries be removed from public access or be destroyed, and "stopped providing…information that used to be routinely released to the public."[8] Information regarding the location of hazardous materials and facilities has been removed from public access, but "agencies have not articulated…the standards they used in choosing what information to make secret."[9] Further efforts to remove sensitive information from public access include provisions in the Homeland Security Act of 2002. These provisions expand exemptions to public information access under the Freedom of Information Act by restricting disclosure of critical infrastructure vulnerabilities provided by private companies to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The provisions also protect disclosing companies from civil law suits and sanction criminal punishment against whistleblowers within government agencies who disclose company data to the public.

It is not always the government that goes too far in censoring material. On February 15, 2002, a librarian at the State University of New York at Oswego sent an email urging libraries to screen requests for Nuclear Regulatory Commission documents. Many librarians were shocked, and approved of a strongly worded letter by the U.S. Government Printing Office urging Oswego's library to resume free access to the document, and stating they had no authority to restrict access in the first place. [10]

The House of Representatives Committee on Science held a hearing concerning SBU information on October 10, 2002 at which several university officials opposed the SBU category. They preferred self-policing measures adopted by the scientific community. The witnesses strongly rejected pre-publication review as going against the tenet of open research and sound science. Dr. John Marburger III, director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy claimed that the government was not considering pre-publication review.

Several interest groups and coalitions have spoken out against the SBU category. In August 2003, Rick Blum from OMB Watch, wrote a letter on behalf of over 70 professional organizations, civil rights groups, special interest groups, and academic associations urging DHS Secretary Tom Ridge to allow public input into the process of defining "homeland security information" in accordance with the Homeland Security Information Sharing Act (HSISA) (P.L. 107-296). [11]

In April 2004, the Association of American Universities, in conjunction with the Council on Government Relations (COGR) Task Force, released Restrictions on Research Awards: Troublesome Cases. The report details 138 instances where restrictive publication practices or prohibitions on foreign nationals were preconditions for acceptance of research grants. The report recommends that federal agencies adhere to NSDD-189, and that the agencies make the distinction between basic research, which is done to increase knowledge, and applied research, done by industry to develop new products. The report stressed that government restrictions are not compatible with academic research. [12]

A study by the Rand Corporation released in May 2004 found that government's attempt to censor information on its websites was ill-advised and ineffective. The U.S. shut down 36 sites and over 600 public databases. The Rand Corporation found that much of the information was not critical for terrorists, and could be obtained elsewhere, such as textbooks, non-government sites, trade journals, or maps. [13]

Despite public outcry, the federal government has expanded the SBU category. DHS issued a directive on June 14, 2004 that exempts agencies from releasing Environmental Impact Statements to the public as required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). This would allow DHS to withhold the statements either in whole or in part from the public, which could render them meaningless. Currently, there are no procedures detailing how to identify sensitive material in the reports. [14]

H.R. 3550, a highway spending bill passed by the House in June 2004, has a provision that would allow the government to keep records secret related to transportation of hazardous materials through cities. [15] This would supersede open-records laws at the state level, and give the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) wide latitude in defining what information is sensitive and should not be released. This would authorize the agency's director to withhold information deemed "detrimental to the safety of passengers in transportation, transportation facilities or infrastructure or transportation employees." Openness advocates have expressed concerns that the law would essentially suspend oversight of the TSA. [16]

Scientists in particular are concerned about the effects of "sensitive but unclassified" on their research. The lack of a widely accepted definition of "sensitive" information means there are no standardized criteria for identifying sensitive information warranting removal from public access. Work on such a definition is underway at the White House Office of Management and Budget.

Scientists also oppose removal of the methodological sections in scientific papers. Although the omission of methods used would make it difficult for terrorists to exploit researchers' findings, it would hamper efforts by legitimate scientists to repeat a researcher's experiment, which is essential for verification of results. Reproducibility of experiments is one of the tenants of the scientific method. Furthermore, since science progresses by building on the work of others, research and innovation could be impeded if scientific information is removed from the public domain, or if access by scientists is otherwise restricted.

Finally, scientists and concerned citizens worry that removal of "critical infrastructure information," such as locations of hazardous materials, may compromise public safety and health, since locals would not know the risks, vulnerabilities, and threats associated with living next to industrial factories or power plants.

Ryan Ricks
July 2004


Notes: [1]. Atlas, Ronald M. "National Security and the Biological Research Community." Science. 298(2002): 753-754.
[2]. NSDD-189, 21 September 1985.
[3]. "OMB Tackles Sensitive but Unclassified information." Secrecy News. 85(2002).
[4]. Ibid.
[5]. Broad, William J. "U.S. is Tightening Rules on Keeping Scientific Secrets." The New York Times. 17 February 2002.
[6]. Countering Agricultural Bioterrorism. National Academy Press, 2002.
[7]. SD-106, 25 March 2002. (later titled "Mandatory Procedures for Research and Technology Protection within the DoD", DoD 5200.39-R)
[8]. Matthews, William. "OMB Weighs Information Classification." Federal Computer Week. 16 September 2002.
[9]. Guzy, Gary S. "Are We Protecting Secrets or Removing Safeguards?" The Washington Post. 24 November 2002: B1.
[10]. Carlson, Scott. "Librarian Calls for Screening Public Access to Nuclear Documents." The Chronicle of Higher Education. 26 February 2002.
[11]. Coalition letter from Open the Government to Secretary Tom Ridge.
[12]. Restrictions on Research Awards: Troublesome Cases. AAU/COGR Task Force. 8 April 2004.
[13]. Baker, John C. et. al. "Mapping the Risks: Assessing the Homeland Security Implications of Publicly Available Geospatial Information." Rand Corporation, 2004 (MG-142-NGA).
[14]. "DHS Seeks Exemptions from Public Disclosure Requirements." OMB Watch. 28 June 2004.
[15]. H.R. 3550 Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (Engrossed as Agreed to or Passed by House)
[16]. Bruggers, James. "Highway bill's secrecy rules spark public-safety debate." Courier-Journal 27 June 2004.

 

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