

## Part 1 – Congressional Action

### 1 – Highlights

On February 13, the 108<sup>th</sup> Congress approved the 11 unfinished fiscal year (FY) 2003 appropriations bills in an omnibus package, completing a task the 107<sup>th</sup> Congress should have finished. President Bush signed the omnibus bill on February 20, finally providing final FY 2003 budgets for agencies that had been operating at FY 2002 levels on stopgap appropriations for more than four months. The budget provides a record-breaking increase for defense R&D, nearly completes the campaign to double the National Institutes of Health (NIH) budget over five years, and offers a substantial increase for the National Science Foundation (NSF).

- **The federal investment in research and development (R&D) hits a new record of \$117.3 billion in FY 2003**, a \$14.2 billion or 13.8 percent increase over FY 2002 that is the largest dollar increase in history coming after another record increase last year, and the largest percentage increase in 20 years (see Table 1 and Figure 1).




Figure 1.

- **In contrast to proposed cuts for most agencies in the budget request, the FY 2003 budget provides at least modest increases for nearly all the major R&D funding agencies (see Table 1 and Figure 2). The priority areas of defense, health, general science, and homeland security receive even greater increases.** The largest dollar and percentage increases go to the two largest R&D funding agencies, the

Department of Defense (DOD) and NIH, reflecting the high priority placed on defense and health by the Bush Administration and Congress. DOD R&D increases by \$8.8 billion or 17.6 percent to reach \$58.6 billion following a similar increase last year. NIH R&D increases 15.5 percent to \$26.2 billion to fall only slightly short of completing a five-year campaign to double the NIH budget. Among the other agencies, NSF does well with an 11.4 percent boost in its R&D funding to an all-time high of \$3.9 billion, which could be the first installment of a five-year campaign to double its budget.




Figure 2.

- **There are large increases for basic and applied research in FY 2003, especially in NIH.** The total federal investment in research is \$52.9 billion, an increase of 9.7 percent or \$4.7 billion over FY 2002 that is well above the FY 2003 request (see Table 2 and Figure 2). NIH remains the largest single sponsor of basic and applied research; in FY 2003, NIH alone will fund 47 percent of all federal support of research, its highest share in history. All federal departments except the Departments of Transportation (DOT) and Commerce receive increases for their research portfolios, with especially large increases for research in NIH, NSF, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).

- Although it was officially created only at the end of January, **the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is poised to become a major player in federal R&D funding.** For FY 2003, R&D programs scheduled to transfer to the new department this year would receive \$669 million in R&D funding, nearly triple the \$266 million for comparable programs in FY 2002. Because there is no budget account yet for DHS, these programs are funded in FY 2003 in their current agencies (DOT, DOD, USDA, and DOE) and will transfer to DHS beginning March 1. In FY 2004, when the new DHS will initiate its own R&D programs, DHS R&D would jump to \$1.0 billion in the request.

- **R&D for nearly all the national missions increases, with especially large boosts for defense and health R&D** (see Table 3). In defense, DOD S&T investments exceed \$11 billion to reach \$11.2 billion (up 8.6 percent) but there are even larger increases for DOD development projects. In health, the NIH budget nearly doubles between FY 1998 and FY 2003 with a \$3.5 billion increase in FY 2003 to \$26.2 billion for R&D, including substantial increases for bioterrorism research and bioterrorism research facilities. Another priority would be general science programs, up 6.4 percent to \$7.0 billion, led by an 11.4 percent for NSF's R&D programs but moderated by flat funding for the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Science. Space R&D would also be a big winner with a 9.2 percent increase to \$10.1 billion because of large increases in the Space Science program and a continuing shift from aeronautics R&D to space-related technology development. The only area of R&D to decline would be transportation (down 7.6 percent to \$1.7 billion) because of cutbacks in NASA aeronautics R&D and a decline in DOT R&D.




Figure 3.

- **Nondefense R&D reaches another all-time high in FY 2003**, the seventh year in a row that nondefense R&D has increased in inflation-adjusted terms (see Figure 3). A large part of this recent growth has been due to steady growth in the NIH budget, including increases of approximately 15 percent for five years in a row. As a result, NIH R&D has become nearly as large as all other nondefense agencies' R&D funding combined. Funding for nondefense R&D excluding NIH has stagnated in recent years; after steady growth in the 1980s, funding peaked in FY 1994 and then declined sharply as a result of tight budget conditions in the mid-1990s. The FY 2003 increases for non-NIH agencies, while large, just barely bring these agencies back to the funding levels of the early 1990s. The FY 2004 budget request, already released, would provide

increases smaller than the expected rate of inflation for nondefense R&D compared to FY 2003 (see *AAAS Report XXVIII: R&D FY 2004* for details of the FY 2004 request).

- **R&D earmarks total \$1.4 billion in FY 2003**, according to a AAAS analysis of congressionally designated, performer-specific R&D projects in the final FY 2003 budget. Although these projects amount to only 1.2 percent of total R&D, they are concentrated in a few key agencies and programs. Four agencies (USDA, \$297 million; NASA, \$190 million; DOE, \$138 million; and DOD, \$426 million) receive nearly three-quarters of the total R&D earmarks. FY 2003 earmarks are down \$26 million from the \$1.5 billion in FY 2002.

## **2 – Overview of R&D Trends**

### **The FY 2003 Congressional Budget Process**

“The process was not the best, but we’re finally here.” Such was the assessment of Congressman C.W. Bill Young (R-FL), Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, upon completion of the massive omnibus appropriations bill that ended the FY 2003 congressional budget process more than four months after the fiscal year had begun. Though offered specifically in reference to the concluding omnibus bill, Chairman Young’s observation could just as well have been said of the entire FY 2003 budget process. Kicked off in February 2002 with the release of the Bush Administration’s budget request, the FY 2003 budget process was marked by the failure of the House and the Senate to arrive at a concurrent budget resolution, partisan squabbles over the wisdom of deficit spending in which Democrats and Republicans continued to all but reverse their historical positions on the issue, the paralytic effects of the November 2002 elections that left little time or inclination for legislation, and growing concern over the budgetary implications of a looming military confrontation with Iraq. When President Bush signed the bill into law on February 20, 2003 – some two weeks after he had submitted his FY 2004 request to Congress – all parties involved were left hoping that the FY 2003 process would soon be forgotten.

The FY 2003 budget process was formally set in motion on February 4, 2002, when President Bush submitted his budget request to Congress. Being the first budget request of the post-September 11 era, the spending plan placed an expected emphasis on national defense and homeland security. Indeed, two of the three overarching thematic priorities highlighted in the request were “protecting the homeland” and “winning the war on terrorism abroad.” Out of \$765 billion in total requested discretionary spending, \$366 billion was to go to the Department of Defense (DOD) and \$25 billion was to be used for homeland security. Add to this another \$10 billion from the supplemental Emergency Response Fund, nearly all of which was slated for national defense and homeland security, and these two activities accounted for 52.4 percent of all requested FY 2003 funds. In FY 2001 and FY 2002, these activities’ shares of discretionary spending stood at 49.7 and 50.2 percent, respectively. Thus, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 continued to shift federal spending priorities noticeably in the direction of greater military might abroad and greater and more coordinated security resources at home.

The Bush Administration also used the budget request to further its plan to resuscitate the ailing economy. By the Administration’s own admission, unemployment was too high, incomes were too stagnant, and business investment was too weak. Not surprisingly, President Bush’s proposal for “returning to economic vitality,” the third thematic priority accented in his budget request, centered on tax cuts. From the beginning of his administration, President Bush had made it a priority to reduce what he saw as an overly excessive federal tax burden on both individuals and corporations. Thus, in June 2001, at a time when budget surpluses were still projected to endure for several years into the future, President Bush signed a tax-relief package that was projected to lighten the federal coffers by \$1.35 trillion over ten years. This despite the objections of congressional Democrats who argued that the legislation’s price tag was too large in light of deteriorating economic conditions and its benefits too skewed toward the wealthy. Then in

October of that year, after the attacks of September 11 and after the publication of a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report that showed a return to deficit spending to be imminent, President Bush put his support behind another plan to reduce taxes; this plan also contained provisions to increase unemployment benefits. This legislation came in at a more modest cost of \$100 billion in FY 2002 and \$159 billion over ten years. And, though the package narrowly won approval in the Republican-controlled House, it died in the Senate, where it received a cool reception from Senate Democrats who had retaken control upon Senator Jim Jeffords' (I - VT) departure from the Republican Party in May. President Bush's placement of an economic recovery plan predicated on tax cuts front and center in his FY 2003 budget request, therefore, signaled to his opponents that he was not about to abandon his cause.

In terms of the R&D content of President Bush's FY 2003 request, the overall emphasis on national defense and homeland security translated into a healthy increase for the DOD's R&D account, which was slated to rise by more than ten percent. R&D at the National Institutes of Health was targeted to reach the end point of its five-year doubling plan with a request more than 17 percent above the level enacted in FY 2002. Apart from these two agencies, however, the R&D picture was mixed. Among the eight remaining top-ten R&D agencies in terms of budgetary size, four were designated for increases in their R&D budgets while four were designated for decreases, with no discernible pattern emerging from the mix. For agency-specific analyses of R&D activity, see Chapter 3 of this publication.

Upon release of the Bush Administration's request, action on the budget then moved to Congress where the annual ritual of agency officials testifying before appropriations committees in support of their agency's request was renewed yet again. Normally, the information gathered during this process would then lead to passage of a concurrent budget resolution that sets forth budget totals and functional allocations that, in turn, guide the work of House and Senate appropriations subcommittees as they fashion the thirteen appropriations bills that fund the federal government. Given the divided control that held sway in Congress, however, the paths toward a budget resolution were quite different in the two chambers. On March 20, the Republican-controlled House passed a budget resolution along partisan lines that was largely consistent with the size and programmatic thrust of the Administration's request. Noteworthy departures from the Administration's request included \$94 billion less in tax cuts over the ensuing five years and \$4.4 billion more in highway construction funds in FY 2003. That same week the Senate Budget Committee reported a budget resolution to the Senate floor that offered its own take on President Bush's request. While in agreement on defense spending, the Senate version of the resolution, backed by a slim Democratic majority in committee, made provisions to set aside an additional \$1.3 billion more than the House for highway construction, \$2.5 billion more than the request for special education, and \$1.4 billion more than the request for local law enforcement, among other add-ons. In the end, the Senate version exceeded the House version by \$10 billion.

Yet, while the Democratic members of the Senate Budget Committee had produced a budget resolution, their leadership failed to bring it forward for debate. Perhaps motivated by the opportunity to use a stalled budget process to draw distinctions between Democrats and Republicans over domestic spending priorities, or perhaps concerned about possible dissent within his own caucus, Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-SD) chose to withhold the resolution from consideration on the Senate floor. Thus, when the statutory deadline of April 15 for passage of a concurrent budget resolution arrived, no resolution was forthcoming and congressional appropriators were left to move forward without a common framework for spending and revenue policy decisions to guide them.

Thus, the budget process, such as it was, lurched forward. Apart from a consensus on defense spending, appropriators in the two chambers moved in different directions. Senate appropriators generally exceeded the presidential request and moved with relative haste, completing versions of each of the thirteen appropriations bills by the August recess. House appropriators, on the other hand, generally honored the more frugal presidential request and moved with greater deliberation, completing only three of the thirteen appropriations by the August recess. And, while genuine policy differences certainly played a role in

hampering greater coordination between the two bodies, by this time electoral considerations were beginning to influence the budget process. The November midterm elections were quickly approaching and both Democrats and Republicans began to use the broken budget process as a campaign issue. For their part, Democrats charged that the Bush Administration's request was insufficient to fund the nation's diverse and growing spending needs, and that their vision – as evidenced in the Senate appropriations bills – was more in tune with current and emerging federal responsibilities. Republicans, on the other hand, cited the Democrats for both excessive spending and legislative mismanagement, pointing to the above-request Senate appropriations bills and the failure of Senator Daschle to deliver a budget resolution approved by the full Senate. Furthermore, some Republican strategists felt that passage of the remaining appropriations bills could even wait until after the elections. Given the expected coattail effects of President Bush's high wartime approval ratings, Republicans felt retaining control of the House and wresting control of the Senate from Democrats was a distinct possibility. With Republicans back in control of both chambers, therefore, Republicans could shape the spending bills to their liking, despite the fact that such a course of action would take the process well into the new fiscal year.

Democratic and Republican differences also became manifest in renewed debates over the return of deficit spending. In this area, however, traditional party positions continued to defy historical precedent. In late August, the CBO issued its midyear budget forecast in which it estimated that the projected ten-year federal budget surplus had shrunk by 60 percent over a period of five months. As recently as March, CBO forecasters had predicted that the federal government would run a surplus of \$2.4 trillion between 2003 and 2012. Now, in its August report, the CBO revised this projected surplus down to \$1 trillion over the same period. CBO forecasters attributed this swing to a dramatic dip in tax receipts. Congressional Democrats pounced on these numbers, asserting that President Bush's tax cuts were to blame and that any further tax cuts would only take the country farther away from its hard-won fiscal balance. Republicans countered that the decline in tax receipts was due to the ailing economy and that additional tax cuts were needed to stimulate the economy and, in turn, restore tax receipts by generating more economic activity. To drive this point home, the Bush Administration and Congressional Republicans then began to float the idea of making the June 2001 tax cuts permanent. The legislation that enabled these cuts had included a ten-year expiration date. This move only increased Democratic resistance and further jumbled the traditional positions of the two parties on the wisdom of deficit spending. Historically, Democrats had accepted deficit spending in order to free up funds for federal programs that the party saw as important. Conversely, Republicans had fought to curb deficit spending so that taxes could be cut and the size of government could be decreased. Now, Republicans were willing to live with deficits if they also resulted in lower taxes while Democrats were prepared to fight deficits financed by what they saw as tax cuts that unduly benefited the wealthy. Of course, even reconstructed Democrats agreed that some deficit spending was inevitable in the post-September 11 world, given the myriad diplomatic, legal, military, and rebuilding efforts that the terrorist attacks produced. Beyond this, however, Democrats' willingness to tolerate deficits, at least rhetorically, grew increasingly thin while Republicans' willingness to rationalize deficits became ever more frequent.

Despite the real policy differences that existed between congressional Democrats and Republicans, they were able to come together on the defense and military construction appropriations bills in October. Committed to supporting ongoing anti-terrorist military operations abroad and looking to shore up their national security credentials prior to the November elections, members of Congress approved a \$355.1 billion defense appropriations bill and a \$10.5 billion military construction bill. Notably, the defense bill did not include \$10 billion in contingency funds to be used at the military's discretion in anti-terrorist operations. Nevertheless, the legislation represented a \$37.5 billion increase from the enacted FY 2002 level, not including FY 2002 supplemental appropriations. As it turned out, this was about the last significant legislative feat that Congress achieved before all of the House members and one-third of the Senate returned home to campaign for reelection. As a result, approximately one month into FY 2003, only two of the thirteen appropriations bills had been completed and most of the federal government was left to operate at FY 2002 levels on the basis of continuing resolutions.

The November midterm elections then changed the FY 2003 budget process and the national political landscape significantly. Largely on the efforts of strategically placed campaign stops by President Bush in support of Republican candidates, the Republicans retook the Senate by picking up two seats and strengthened their control in the House by adding six seats. Now in charge of the House, Senate, and the White House, Republicans were emboldened to move on those legislative items that had been brought to a standstill by a divided Congress, including spending bills. However, the election results notwithstanding, not all was unified in the Republican family. Even before the elections, there had been rumblings on the House appropriations subcommittee that funds the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services and Education (Labor-HHS) that strict adherence to the president's bottom line would harm some social programs important to Republican members of the subcommittee. Republican discontent, as it turned out, was not confined to the Labor-HHS subcommittee. Other House Republicans also felt that congressional priorities had been made subservient to presidential priorities. Thus, when members returned for a short, lame-duck session of Congress after the elections, the requisite unity among House Republicans to continue work on the outstanding appropriations bills was absent. Moreover, Republicans would not formally retake control of the Senate until the new Congress was seated in January. In light of these circumstances, the Republican leadership chose to punt and take up the remaining spending bills in the new year.

By the time that Republicans installed their majorities in both chambers of Congress in January in the 108<sup>th</sup> Congress, new and emerging fiscal issues were becoming increasingly prominent on the national agenda. By this time, drought relief for the plains states, monetary relief for nearly all states of the union facing severe budgetary deficits of their own, and the associated costs of a looming military confrontation with Iraq had crept in to the debate over FY 2003 spending, threatening to further bog down the effort to bring closure to the process. At this point, both the House and Senate leadership agreed that the speediest way to conclude the process would be to wrap the remaining eleven appropriations bills into one omnibus appropriations bill. Thus, as the release of the FY 2004 budget drew ever nearer, the House and Senate began the end game of drafting their versions of an appropriations bill that would cover all agencies of the federal government except for the Department of Defense. On January 23, the Senate approved a \$390 billion version of the bill. Then on January 28, the House, by unanimous consent, decided to forego their own version of the bill and move immediately to conference. Finally, on February 13, both the House and the Senate approved a record \$397.4 billion omnibus appropriations bill that spanned some 3,000 pages. President Bush signed the bill into law on February 20.

Beyond the sometimes comically glacial pace of the FY 2003 budget process, there are serious lessons to be taken from it. As long as the war on terrorism remains salient, increasingly large shares of future discretionary spending are likely to be devoted to national defense and homeland security. Moreover, should military action against Iraq proceed, these shares will grow even larger as the deployment, combat, and occupation costs associated with such action will be significant. Additionally, Democratic and Republican positions on deficit spending are likely to continue their evolution in directions counter to their historical antecedents. In light of their strong ideological commitment to lower tax burdens, Republicans will continue their defense of short-run deficits in the name of long-run economic stimulus. For their part, Democrats will solidify their position as the new defenders of fiscal balance, decrying tax cuts as the chief threats to such balance. And, because the latest CBO projections do not anticipate a return to surpluses until 2007, the issue could evolve as a pivot point around which the two parties define themselves with regard to the fundamental task of government to tax and spend.

### **Emerging R&D Issues: Earmarks**

In September 2001, OMB Director Mitch Daniels re-opened the R&D earmarks debate when he requested that members of the academic research community refrain from seeking earmarks as part of an Bush

Administration effort to streamline federally funded research and contain overall discretionary spending. Earmarks, according to Daniels, were putting a strain on some government science budgets and forcing appropriators to forego research projects that would otherwise merit funding. This came in the wake of earlier efforts to monitor R&D earmarks and explore their implications for the practice of science. In the early 1990s, the late George E. Brown, Jr. used his position as Chairman of the House Committee on Science, Space and Technology to hold hearings on the rise of earmarks related to the performance of federally funded scientific research. At roughly the same time, the *Chronicle of Higher Education* initiated an annual survey tracking the incidence of academic earmarks – most of which relate to scientific research – in the federal appropriations process.




Figure 4.

Earmarks in the R&D context raise specific concerns over the purported trade-off between scientific norms and economic necessity. Opponents point out that such earmarks reduce the overall quality of science because they circumvent the peer-review process, thereby weakening a key cornerstone of the traditional scientific ethos. Defenders of the practice, however, maintain that the pursuit of R&D earmarks is an important strategy in the effort “spread the wealth” and help smaller research institutions compete with their wealthier counterparts.

This publication takes no position on the economic, political or scientific wisdom of R&D earmarks. However, because the topic is likely to remain of interest to policymakers and members of the research community who are concerned about the allocation of R&D resources, it does offer an analysis of R&D earmarks in the FY 2002 and now the FY 2003 federal appropriations process. For the purposes of this

analysis, R&D earmarks are defined as “congressionally designated performer-specific R&D projects not included in agency budget requests.”

As Table A and Figure 4 show, R&D earmarks declined slightly in the FY 2003 budget to \$1.4 billion, down from \$1.5 billion in FY 2002. This decline happened despite a record-setting increase in the total R&D budget to \$117 billion, meaning that congressionally designated, performer-specific R&D projects are a smaller percentage of the total R&D portfolio than last year. The share of R&D earmarks in the total federal R&D portfolio declines from 1.4 percent last year to 1.2 percent in FY 2003 despite, by all accounts, a record number and dollar amount of earmarks in the total appropriated budget of \$763 billion (FY 2003).

It appears that earmarked projects in non-R&D areas such as transportation, health care facilities, and local environmental grants increased, but R&D earmarks ran counter to the general trend. Four agencies (the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA; \$297 million), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA; \$190 million), the Department of Energy (DOE; \$138 million) and the Department of Defense (DOD; \$426 million) receive nearly three-quarters of the total R&D earmarks. (For more details on R&D earmarks in FY 2003, please see the special R&D Earmarks in the FY 2003 Budget analysis on the AAAS R&D web site.)

Although OMB and the Bush Administration made restraining congressional earmarks a high priority of the Administration in 2001, his powers of persuasion were no match for congressional appropriators’ jealously guarded power to determine the allocation of funds, and his earmark-fighting zeal moderated in 2002. Although Daniels continued to argue against earmarks, the Administration and Congress appeared to reach an agreement in the FY 2003 budget process that Congress could allocate funds as it chose as long as the overall budget totals added up to no more than the President’s request. So while the FY 2003 discretionary spending total of \$763 billion approved by Congress matches the President’s request, Congress rewrote the budget request extensively and added, according to preliminary estimates, billions of dollars in earmarked projects in what may turn out to be a new record. But R&D earmarks decline, while it appears that non-R&D earmarked projects in transportation, community development grants (nearly 900 projects in one Housing and Urban Development program), EPA water grants (nearly 500 projects in just one EPA account), and health care facilities (more than 450 projects in one HRSA account) hit new heights. And two of the largest sources of research funding, NIH and the R&RA part of NSF, remained free of performer-specific designations.

Table A. Congressional Earmarks for FY 2003 R&amp;D by Agency

**Table A. Congressional Earmarks for R&D by Agency and Program**  
**Congressional Action on R&D in the FY 2003 Budget**  
**(budget authority in millions of dollars)**

	FY 2002 Earmarks	FY 2003		Earmarks % of R&D
		FY 2003 Earmarks	FY 2003 R&D	
Defense (military)	336	<b>426</b>	58,646	0.7%
<i>(Army)</i>	120	<b>152</b>	7,510	2.0%
<i>(Navy)</i>	68	<b>111</b>	13,599	0.8%
<i>(Air Force)</i>	43	<b>41</b>	18,763	0.2%
<i>(Defense Agencies)</i>	90	<b>71</b>	17,377	0.4%
<i>(Other)</i>	13	<b>52</b>	1,397	3.7%
National Aeronautics & Space Admin.	233	<b>190</b>	10,999	1.7%
<i>(Space Science)</i>	30	<b>8</b>	3,501	0.2%
<i>(Earth Science)</i>	38	<b>49</b>	1,708	2.8%
<i>(Bio. And Phys. Res.)</i>	15	<b>25</b>	863	2.9%
<i>(Aero-Space Technology)</i>	83	<b>60</b>	2,873	2.1%
<i>(Academic Programs)</i>	67	<b>47</b>	203	23.3%
Energy	171	<b>138</b>	8,205	1.7%
<i>(Science programs)</i>	72	<b>50</b>	3,075	1.6%
<i>(Energy programs)</i>	65	<b>36</b>	1,281	2.8%
<i>(Defense programs)</i>	35	<b>52</b>	3,849	1.3%
Health and Human Services	31	<b>62</b>	27,550	0.2%
<i>(National Institutes of Health)</i>	0	<b>0</b>	26,245	0.0%
National Science Foundation	50	<b>50</b>	3,927	1.3%
<i>(Major Research Equipment)</i>	50	<b>50</b>	149	33.8%
Agriculture	369	<b>297</b>	2,166	13.7%
<i>(Agricultural Res. Service)</i>	257	<b>166</b>	1,184	14.0%
<i>(CSREES)</i>	107	<b>129</b>	608	21.2%
<i>(Forest Service)</i>	5	<b>3</b>	265	1.0%
Interior	14	<b>18</b>	627	2.9%
<i>(U.S. Geological Survey)</i>	14	<b>11</b>	569	1.9%
Transportation	63	<b>54</b>	835	6.5%
Environmental Protection Agency	62	<b>53</b>	643	8.2%
Commerce	72	<b>136</b>	1,248	10.9%
<i>(NOAA)</i>	31	<b>107</b>	684	15.6%
<i>(NIST)</i>	42	<b>29</b>	527	5.6%
Education	0	<b>1</b>	315	0.3%
Agency for Int'l Development	4	<b>4</b>	271	1.5%
Department of Veterans Affairs	0	<b>0</b>	800	0.0%
Housing and Urban Development	30	<b>11</b>	50	21.1%
Department of Justice	29	<b>3</b>	108	2.9%
All Other	5	<b>2</b>	905	0.2%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,470</b>	<b>1,444</b>	<b>117,297</b>	<b>1.2%</b>

AAAS estimates of R&D in FY 2003 House and Senate appropriations bills. Includes conduct of R&D and R&D facilities.

All figures are rounded to the nearest million. Changes calculated from unrounded figures.

**"Earmarks" are AAAS interpretations of unrequested, congressionally designated, performer-specific R&D projects contained in legislative language or committee report language in appropriations bills.**

Earmarks do not include non-R&D congressionally designated projects.