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Issue Brief

October 6, 2000

The Hamilton-Baker Report
Report on Missing Hard Drives Calls for Reform

by Maureen Thyne
Intern, AAAS Scientific Freedom, Responsibility and Law Program

On June 1, 2000, John Browne, the Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, was informed that two computer hard drives containing sensitive nuclear information were missing from the vault in which they were stored. The drives had been missing since at least May 7, 2000, but no report was made to the proper authorities until May 31. According to laboratory rules, any loss of classified material must be reported within 24 hours. The drives were found on June 16 behind a copying machine not far from the vault, but there is still no explanation for the incident.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Justice Department, and the U.S. Attorney's Office in Albuquerque, NM have each launched investigations into the incident. In addition, the Department of Energy Secretary, Bill Richardson, asked former Senator Howard Baker (18 years, R-TN) and former Congressman Lee Hamilton (34 years, D-IN) to conduct a "thorough investigation and assessment into the circumstances surrounding the security incident … and make the necessary recommendations for corrective measures." Their goal was to examine the facts of the case without establishing any culpability and without interfering with the law enforcement efforts mentioned above.

The incident at the Los Alamos Laboratory was a serious breach in security. Los Alamos is responsible for the research, design, development and safe stewardship of 85% of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Missing information of this sort can be extremely damaging to U.S. national security if other countries gain access or control of it. In their investigation, Hamilton and Baker attempted to propose causes for the loss of the hard drives and to explain the significant time lapse from when the drives were discovered missing to when their absence was reported. In their report to Energy Secretary Richardson and President Clinton, Hamilton and Baker offer a series of suggestions, changes, and improvements that would prevent another situation such as this from occurring.

Lapses in security and a lack of organization at all levels of management were identified as the most significant causes for the security breach at the Los Alamos lab. Information as sensitive as that encoded on the missing hard drives deserves to be handled with the utmost care and caution to ensure that its restricted classification is maintained. That no one reported the disks missing until 24 days after their disappearance is a significant security issue, and the rules and regulations which Hamilton and Baker found to be "so numerous as to be needlessly complex" certainly did nothing to improve the situation. There was also general confusion about authority and hierarchy - employees did not always know who was in charge or to whom they should go with concerns. These confused lines of communication and command, say Hamilton and Baker, led to a "widespread lack of a sense of personal responsibility and accountability for security."

Hamilton and Baker proposed several recommendations and changes. First, they say, immediate efforts should be implemented to improve the declining morale and productivity at the lab, including specific training for all employees and an elimination of the current "zero tolerance" policy on information security. This should include information about the role security plays in the protection of the scientist's work without instilling fear of punishment for reporting security incidents. Ideally, Hamilton and Baker say, "security must be viewed not as a burden… but rather as an integral part" of the scientific research done at the lab.

Regarding security, the report advised ensuring consistent handling of restricted data, reviewing security classifications of sensitive data, and introducing comprehensive security upgrades. Material and information of this importance needs to be clearly and uniformly classified, and that which is labeled "restricted" should be protected and monitored with the latest security measures available.

To help the organization of the lab, the lines of communication should be clarified and a clear chain of responsibility should be established. To reestablish accountability, the role of each administrator, manager, department, and unit within the lab and the Department of Energy should be clear to all employees. This understanding will foster trust and loyalty among employees, improving the workplace for all. With these changes, Hamilton and Baker conclude, it will again be possible for "science and security [to] reinforce one another in the service of the Nation."

Key Points Made in the Hamilton-Baker Report

Significant lapses in security measures were caused by:

• Widespread misunderstanding of security and administrative protocol;
• General lack of organization;
• An environment of suspicion and low morale.

Together, these factors produced conditions that proved unsuitable for productive work.

These security concerns can be addressed through:

• Implementation of employee training measures;
• Clarification of communication and command chains;
• Simplification and understanding of the security procedures which exist to protect the valuable science which is conducted in the lab.

Resources

"Baker And Hamilton To Investigate And Assess Los Alamos Security Incident," Department of Energy News Release. June 13, 2000.

Testimony from the Joint Hearing of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee and the Senate Energy and Natural Resource Committee. June 14, 2000.

Pincus, Walter. "Los Alamos Senior Scientist Faces Firing in Hard-Drives Probe," Washington Post. September 30, 2000, page A08.

Sandoval, Steve. "Los Alamos Still the Crown Jewel," Daily Newsbulletin - Los Alamos National Laboratory. August 10, 2000.