The War on Terrorism: What Does It Mean for Science? Symposium Report

The War on Terrorism: What Does it Mean for Science?

Symposium Report
American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)

December 18, 2001

In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, the already complex balance between national security, scientific freedom, and human rights has become even more complicated. In the months after the attacks, the scientific community, like other professional groups and government organizations, began a process of reflection about how the changed circumstances affect the conduct of their work as well as their responsibilities to the government and society.

The issue of terrorism has significant scientific dimensions. Terrorism involves the use of technology and the manipulation of fear, which is something that both scientists and engineers have long studied. The prevention of future attacks and the management of current threats require the involvement of the scientific community. From the response of medical professionals in the immediate aftereffects to the work of engineers in designing safer buildings, one can clearly see the vital role that science plays in working for the security and well-being of society.

However, the nation's response to terrorism may also have implications on the ability of the scientific and engineering community to operate in what has traditionally been a very open climate of international exchange and travel. Security measures may have potentially negative effects on the ability to freely publish scientific findings, research certain topics, and conduct international exchanges.

While none of the issues of balancing scientific freedom and national security are new, they certainly have become more complex in the post-September 11th world. AAAS believes that it is critical that the scientific community and the larger public to be engaged in evaluating policy and its impact on the environment for research. It is also important for the scientific community to carefully consider their own professional and personal roles and responsibilities in this very dynamic and highly charged political environment.

In order to facilitate this dialogue, AAAS convened a public symposium, entitled "The War on Terrorism: What Does It Mean for Science?" The impetus for this symposium emerged from discussions held by the AAAS Committee on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility, which met just two weeks after the events of September 11. Members of the Committee expressed a need for the scientific community to address scientific freedom and human rights concerns related to the "War on Terrorism" and also to revisit the question of scientific responsibility in the changed national context. The Committee thought that it was especially important to hold a public forum in order to foster the consideration of these issues by a wide cross section of the scientific community and members of the general public.

Four hundred people registered to attend the event, which had to be moved off site at the last minute to accommodate the numbers of participants. The symposium was part of an ongoing project, the AAAS Project on Scientific Freedom and National Security, which is directed by staff of the AAAS Science and Human Rights Program and the AAAS Scientific Freedom, Responsibility & Law Program, both part of the AAAS Directorate for Science and Policy Programs. The event was cosponsored by the AAAS Committee on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility and funded by a grant from the Open Society Institute. Additional funding came from private sources.

This report provides the official text of the keynote address given by Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy Dr. John H. Marburger, III. The report also summarizes the two panel presentations.

Keynote address

Official text prepared by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy.

Dr. John H. Marburger, III
Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy

I wish to thank the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the organizers of this symposium on "The War on Terrorism", and the distinguished panel members and attendees for creating this event and inviting me to speak. The topic is "The War on Terrorism: What Does it Mean for Science?" This morning I want to offer a few perhaps surprising answers to this question, then describe how the Administration is organizing itself to mobilize science, and, time permitting, to give some examples of science, technology, and engineering in the service of homeland security.

First, this Administration is determined not to let terrorism deflect America from its trajectory of world leadership in science. Our nation's prowess in technology, especially information technology and instrumentation, has opened extraordinary new vistas in science. It has made it possible to visualize and manipulate matter on the atomic scale, leading to unprecedented understanding and control of the processes of life as well as of inanimate matter. Having produced the means for great strides in science, and in accompanying technologies for improved health care, economic competitiveness, and quality of life, it would be foolish to turn aside now from the course of discovery while we engage the monster of terrorism -- an evil force that denies the benefits of progress and the search for truth. Thus I expect that science in America and the world will forge ahead relatively unaffected by the war against terrorism. I expect the President's prior commitment to increase funding for health related research to be realized. I expect the tremendous momentum in the information sciences to roll forward. I expect the technologies of measurement and analysis -- atomic scale microscopy and manipulation, light sources, probes, detectors and analyzers -- to continue to win new ground on the frontiers of complexity as well as of scale. Science has its own intrinsic imperative and this nation will continue to pursue it.

Second, this administration is determined to win the war against terrorism, and President Bush is mobilizing all the talents and resources of our immensely strong society to that end. He is doing this through the conventional mechanisms of American government, and he is drawing upon much previous work that prepared us for this struggle. It is too easy to criticize -- after the fact -- a prosperous peace-time nation for unpreparedness in the face of danger. A better criterion for defensive health would be the speed with which a nation under attack can respond effectively. There is no question that the steps New York took after the first world Trade Center attack in 1993 saved numerous lives in the second attack eight years later, and expedited a response that limited the scope of its evil consequences. Nor is there doubt that lessons learned from attacks on U.S. embassies and federal buildings limited the damage to the Pentagon, portions of which had been remodeled with designs based upon these lessons. Our consciousness of the biowarfare work of troubled regimes elsewhere in the world had led to studies of biodefenses and to exercises designed to teach us where our greatest vulnerabilities lay before September 11. I do not mean to imply that we were as prepared as we could have been, or perhaps should have been. But many of the means required for a war against terrorism were already available to us, and only needed to be enlisted in a systematic way to support the effort. This readiness is most visible in the technologies now in play in the war beyond our borders -- in Afghanistan for now. But significant readiness of homeland technology is also apparent, though not yet fully mobilized. We are not starting "from scratch" in the technology of homeland defense. We have much relevant technology, and the challenge is to deploy it effectively.

I am making these points to cool somewhat a fever that I fear is rising in the scientific community -- a notion that science may be diverted in a massive way as it was in World War II, the course of discovery interrupted, the quality of intellectual life distorted and impaired. Or on the other hand, that a great windfall for science is at hand, at least for some of us, because of the need for new research bent to the exigencies of new forms of warfare.

Science does indeed have much to offer in this war, and for three months in my new capacity as Presidential Science Advisor, I have been urging America's science and engineering organizations to respond to the President's call. And I have been immensely impressed and gratified by the response. Today's conference is taking place as the momentum is gathering, and as the first signs of its direction are becoming evident. We are on our way. Our awareness of the need has been aroused. Now let us reflect dispassionately on what happens from here on.

THE STATE OF SCIENCE NOW COMPARED WITH WORLD WAR II

Prior to World War II, science had reached a monumental turning point. Quantum physics had flung open the gates to a staggering vista of opportunity that was not to be realized until after the war. Our understanding of chemistry, of materials, of nuclear phenomena, of optical properties, of the processes of life, began to expand at an explosive rate. The wartime scientific effort labored urgently to apply this new capability to applications of the highest leverage for military operations. Radar and nuclear weapons come first to mind, but there were others.

Prior to the war on terrorism, the modern era of science had matured, and a wealth of knowledge and technique now lies at hand. In nearly every area where technology can be applied to homeland defense, the basic knowledge exists, and the need is for engineering to turn known phenomena into devices, and to embed the devices into practical systems. The single greatest exception to this rule is in the response to bioterrorism, where additional research is needed on the mechanisms of diseases likely to be exploited by terrorists.

Some have spoken of the need for a "Manhattan Project" to satisfy the needs of homeland security. The analogy is wrong-headed. Cleverness is needed less now than a national will to use what we have to strengthen the infrastructure of our daily lives, to bolster public health systems, to equip properly our first responders, to use more effectively the information technology, the detection technology, the biotechnology that we already possess to render the way we live less vulnerable to what the military scholars call "asymmetric threats." We need to plan, and to carry out our plans. And that is one of the functions of the Office of Homeland Security.

THE OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Following the events of September 11th, President Bush created an Office of Homeland Security, headed by Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge. Through Presidential Decision Directives 1 and 2, OHS is tasked with coordinating government efforts to stop all forms of terrorism before they occur and responding to an attack if one should happen. As advisor to the President and Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, I too was tasked by the PDD and Governor Ridge with specific issues pertinent to our discussion today.

For several years the federal government has been concerned that such attacks might occur. For decades, the Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services, Energy and Agriculture have engaged in anti-terrorism activities that have contributed to the protection of our Homeland and the creation of technologies which have benefited our everyday security and existence. The attacks of September 11 forced us to view all these preparations in a new light. How do we think systematically about this new kind of war?

When President Bush introduced the notion of a War Against Terrorism, my first thought was how a map for such a war would differ from a conventional battle map. Conventional wars are fought for territory, easily measured on a chart with latitude and longitude, but the fronts in the war against terrorism cover multiple dimensions. How can we detect an unprotected flank in this complex territory? How do we measure progress?

We need a taxonomy and a common language to assess threats, avoid duplication, and facilitate interagency cooperation and coordination. Developing a useful taxonomy is a deep problem, for which I have sought assistance from the National Academies as part of a broader service they intend to render through a new committee. I am grateful to the Academies which assembled shortly after the attacks a valuable workshop discussion of how the science community might organize itself in response. It was during that workshop that I understood the need to shape a federal interface to link the extraordinary wealth of science and technology to our anti-terrorism efforts. Subsequently, I met with industry associations, non-profit groups, university organizations, scientific and engineering societies, and the National Academies to learn what kind of interface might be appropriate.

OSTP has executive and legislative mandates to coordinate federal science and technology activities. OSTP is consequently in a position to call on organizations, internal and external to the federal government, as we provide support to the Office of Homeland Security, and other offices responsible for aspects of the war on terrorism.

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

My office has been asked to fill the Research and Development component of OHS for the time being. OSTP has a history of coordinating R&D in this area, primarily through our efforts on Preparedness against Weapons of Mass Destruction and Critical Infrastructure Protection. We have been focusing our energies on short-term issues such as mail security, baggage screening, and civilian preparedness. But we are also taking steps to identify long-term S&T opportunities that will help the United States win the war against terrorism.

Under the structure of the National Science and Technology Council, I am establishing an interagency Antiterrorism Task Force with several working groups to address broad categories of issues. The four working groups focus on Biological/Chemical Agents; Radiological/Nuclear/Conventional Detection and Response; Protection of Vulnerable Systems; and Social, Behavioral, and Education Sciences. We are establishing a Rapid Response Team as a fifth working group. This action-oriented team will grapple with emergencies that may arise. It will also serve as a clearinghouse for technical reviews of the many incoming proposals on technologies related to homeland security.

HOW CAN SCIENCE HELP?

Science and engineering have critical roles to play in the war on terrorism. We need improved tools with which to prevent, detect, protect, and treat victims of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and conventional terrorist attacks. Additionally, we will need new and improved tools to recover facilities from those same types of attacks, should they ever occur. Many cases call for a "systems approach," rather than simply perfection of a single device.

Mail Security

In late October, Director Ridge asked that OSTP provide technical support for the treatment of U.S. mail potentially contaminated by Bacillus anthracis. The day after his phone call I convened chief science officials from a number of relevant agencies and the U.S. Postal Service to ascertain the technical issues that the Postal Service was encountering. This led to an interagency technical team that, within days, began evaluating the irradiation facilities at Lima, Ohio, and Bridgeport, New Jersey.

By mid-November, with strong scientific data on the use of electron beam technology to irradiate the mail and the establishment of sound standard operating procedures, I endorsed an advisory to the U.S. Postal Service that the procedures being used were able to rid the mail of Bacillus contamination. We continue to work with this scientific team to refine the irradiation process and to explore other available technologies to rid the mail of potential pathogens.

Airline Security

An example where a systems approach is needed is airline security. Right now, our chief tool is the transmission X-ray. Other technologies can significantly improve our capabilities to detect weapons of terror, develop these detection technologies for rapid deployment, and think carefully how to integrate the ones adopted, as a coherent package, into airline routines. We must do this in such a way that they not create unpleasant delays and unaffordable expenses, but do enhance both security and passenger confidence. Potential technologies range from dogs that can sniff out explosives to computer-based biometrics to resonant gamma ray imaging of concealed explosives, and laser interrogation of trace compounds.

Building Design and Construction

Fire was critical in the collapse of the World Trade Center buildings and contributed to damage to the Pentagon buildings, but current building design practice does not consider fire as a design requirement. Current emergency response procedures could not adequately cope with the events in those buildings.

Buildings today are not immune from chemical, biological, and radiological threats. Efforts are underway to protect military buildings through DARPA's "immune building" program, but there are no standards and practices for civilian buildings.

Prior to 9/11, the Corps of Engineers helped design several modifications to the Pentagon as part of a completed renovation. Analysis of past attacks, data from experimental detonations and super computer simulations led to structural hardening innovations, including a strong steel support matrix, a Kevlar wrap to contain shrapnel-like fragments, and blast resistant windows. That work saved many lives.

POTENTIAL IMPACT ON SCIENCE

Let me turn now to the more delicate subject of how the war on terrorism, and the fear of terrorism, may impact the conduct of science.

Increased Security Measures

Increased security measures are, of course, helpful if they actually decrease the chances that unauthorized people will gain access to classified material, and they do not adversely impact the missions of those implementing the measures. Security measures implemented without adequate forethought can backfire if they do not significantly improve security and have a negative impact on science and agency missions. We need to identify systematically where additional security measures are needed and develop thoughtful responses sensitive to the importance of activities they might impede.

Tracking Students

Many people come from around the world to study in U.S. undergraduate and graduate programs. Some come from the same countries that we believe generate terrorists. It is important that international students continue to come to the U.S. to study and contribute to our science and technology enterprise. They are a major factor in our nation's world scientific leadership. They also learn to appreciate the advantages of our educational system and acquire skills that will enable them to contribute quality of life in their own countries. But we do need better ways of identifying the few that come to enhance their effectiveness as terrorists. We are currently grappling with what new measures should be introduced, both to identify terrorists before they receive visas, and to identify potential terrorists by their activities after they come to the U.S.

International Nature of Science

Our nation today is a science superpower. The scope of our scientific activity, both basic and applied, is breathtaking and unmatched. We are not, however, a science monopoly, and we have much to learn from colleagues elsewhere in the world. Science thrives on open discourse. Measures that inhibit discourse will impede progress. We cannot limit scientific interactions with other nations without paying a scientific price.

CONCLUSION

During my two months in office I have been impressed by the importance that the President and his Senior Staff place on science and technology. I see this in the questions they ask and in their receptivity to advice offered. The President himself has undertaken to learn technical detail on important issues. This is not to say that science dominates decision-making. Science tells what can be done, not what should be done. But at the highest levels of the U.S. Government there is an acknowledged need for good science, and an appreciation for the needs of science.

Thank you for the opportunity to reflect on this important topic.

Morning Session: Doing Science After September 11: Scientific Freedom & Responsibility Issues

Moderated by Christian Davenport, Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, and AAAS Committee on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility

Rashid A. Chotani, Johns Hopkins School of Medicine
Louis W. Goodman, School of International Service, American University
Robert O'Neil, The Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression
Anne A. Witkowsky, CSIS Committee on Science and Security

The morning session dealt with many of the human rights issues related to the U.S. government response to the terrorist attacks. Panelists presented anecdotal evidence that the fear of intolerance may be greater than the thing itself. Louis Goodman, Dean of the School of International Service at the American University, reported that more than 80 students from the Gulf States have left school and returned home at their parents' insistence, because of parents' fears of reprisals and violence-this despite a general mood of reason and calm on campus. Dr. Rashid Chotani, an epidemiologist working on bioterrorism issues at Johns Hopkins University, and a naturalized U.S. citizen originally from Pakistan, reported that he personally has experienced little or no adverse reaction to his ethnicity or religion, although other Muslim scientists in the U.S. and Europe have reported incidents of violence directed at them.

Although he said that it is possible to cite positive examples of tolerance after September 11, Robert O'Neil of the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Freedom of Expression expressed concern about academic freedom and free expression on campus. He cited the example of a December 2001 commencement address at California State University in Sacramento by Janis Besler Heaphy, president and publisher of the Sacramento Bee. After saying that the government's response to the September 11 attacks would erode civil liberties, repeated jeers and outbursts from the audience forced her to stop speaking only eight minutes into her presentation.

The national labs have been dealing with issues related to racism and xenophobia during the fallout of the Wen Ho Lee investigation. The fourth morning panelist, Anne Witkowsky, Director of the Commission on Science and Security, a federally appointed commission charged with making recommendations to the Department of Energy, discussed lessons learned during the Commission's review process. She stated that the events of September 11 did not significantly change the Commission's analysis and recommendations. But according to Ms. Witkowsky, the Commission's research could provide some valuable lessons learned on how to integrate security measures into institutions. The Commission has learned the difficulty of approaching national security issues with a zero tolerance philosophy, indicating that more can be gained by instituting a climate of trust between scientists and security professionals.

Revisiting Scientists' Responsibilities

Afternoon Keynote Address by William A. Wulf, President, National Academy of Engineering

Moderated by Mark S. Frankel, Director, Scientific Freedom, Responsibility and Law Program, AAAS

K. Eric Drexler, Founder, Foresight Institute
Kevin S. McCurley, President, International Association for Cryptologic Research
Jonathan D. Moreno, Director, Center for Biomedical Ethics, University of Virgina
Gerold Yonas, Vice President and Principal Scientist, Sandia National Laboratories

The afternoon session focused mainly on the responsibilities of scientists and engineers for the use of their discoveries, what role scientists and engineers have in contributing to national security, and the effect the terrorist events will have on the practice of science. In his keynote address, Dr. William Wulf, President of the National Academy of Engineering, asserted that the solution to terrorism will have a significant science and technology component and that academic scientists and engineers will be involved with the war on terrorism very differently than in past wars. Wulf called on scientists to fulfill the need for more research, stating that basic research, motivated by practical concerns, will have its roots in academia. He specifically called for research in the areas of biology, medicine, bioterrorism against our food supply, and social and behavioral sciences to aid the new war.

The remainder of the afternoon discussion focused on the responsibilities of scientists with the events of September 11 in mind. Citing his own experience in the field of nanotechnology, Dr. Eric Drexler, founder of the Foresight Institute, explained the responsibility of scientists to consider the consequences of the technologies they create by virtue of their unique understanding of the research. He called on the scientific community to look ahead, prepare, and continue to develop and use networks of people that are familiar with the technology and issues at stake to foster an open discussion and protect against negative implications of new technologies.

Speaking about national security issues in times of war, Dr. Kevin McCurley, President of the International Association for Cryptologic Research, observed that the mission of national security does not align well with the goals and nature of science and the true problem lies deciphering where the balance lies and how much can be forgone in the name of national security. An additional worry comes from a history of past abuses against human subjects during times of war. Dr. Jonathan Moreno, Director of the Center for Biomedical Ethics at the University of Virginia, gave a historical perspective on past injustices and warned against a weakening of rights for human research subjects that may come with pressure for increased national security.