PART 7

150 Years of American Science Policy

In this section, we trace the history of science policy during the existence of AAAS. Chapter 26 provides an overall view of the first 150 years of AAAS. Other chapters focus on particular periods. Piecing these chapters together gives us insight into how we got to where we are. This section also gives us a context in which to place some of the issues discussed in previous sections.

Amy Crumpton and Albert H. Teich of AAAS look at the history of the Association as "an intriguing reference point" in understanding the evolving relationship between the scientific community and policymakers. During the early years, AAAS reflected the interests of an elite group of scientists who lobbied Congress and government officials to gain a voice for scientists in national affairs. The Association's influence began to fade when the National Academy of Sciences emerged, with a congressional charter to coordinate science and technology in the service of the federal government. In the early 20th century, AAAS's principal contributions on policy issues were made in the journal Science and the Committees of One Hundred. Annual meetings provided forums for scientists to discuss issues of pressing social concern. In addition, reports and monographs from meeting symposia and committee reports were published, which helped increase AAAS's influence.

Over the past 50 years, AAAS has changed from a vehicle for communication among its members to an organization running programs on behalf of its members. It has become one voice among many organizations. Committees and annual meetings, as well as well-established relationships among AAAS and government agencies, have all played roles in the Association's effectiveness.

Marc Rothenberg focuses on the contributions of one man in order to describe U.S. science policy from 1840 to 1875. Joseph Henry served on many ad hoc and more permanent committees, as an advisor to the government, and as a liaison between scientific communities and the government. "He was the principal lobbyist for the American scientific community." In 1846, he became Secretary of the Smithsonian and his influence expanded considerably. From that year until his death in 1878 he had more political influence than any other scientist. Part of his success was due to the "political savvy" alluded to in the last section. He was a civic scientist, to use Neal Lane's term. He believed that politicians could be educated about the importance of science and they would then respond positively to requests by the scientific community.

David M. Hart takes us back to 1921 and examines science and economic policy until 1953. This period saw tremendous growth, culminating in the era of "Big Science." Even "Little Science," or individual researcher science, expanded dramatically. This growth had profound effects on the economy. We saw the rise of industry regulation and laws intended to influence the direction of technological innovation during this period. Yet with all these changes, there was no master plan. The Bush report, Hart says, was a political tactic, not a blueprint. Science came together from many different visions, which is how a democratic society works. Postwar federal science policy had many political roots.

We end where we beganwith President Truman's 1948 address. William A. Blanpied tells us that the recommendations Truman made came from an almost forgotten report of the President's Scientific Research Board. It was called the Steelman report after the Board's chair, John Steelman. Blanpied takes us through the politics of the formation of the National Science Foundation, which Truman had vetoed in August, yet recommended in his address about a year later. Blanpied counts this as the event that ended the postwar period, which began with the Bush report. He extends the discussion Hart started when he called the Bush report a political tactic rather than a blueprint. But Blanpied goes into more detail. We are reminded of the story of Joseph Henry when Blanpied says Bush envisioned a national science agency that could function in isolation from politics.

Blanpied laments that the Steelman report never generated the wide-ranging debate on science-government relations it could have. This would have been in the best interests of science, government, and U.S. society. It was "a significant opportunity lostone whose impacts are still discernible after 50 years."